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FORCED ADMISSIONS BY ALLEN DULLES. (By D. Zaslavsky. Pravda, June 21, p. 4. 1200 words. Condensed text:) Not long ago the reactionary American magazine U.S. News and World Report printed an extensive interview with Allen Dulles, Director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The magazine printed this interview under the intriguing headline: "We Tell Russia Too Much."

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Who are "we"?
What are "we" telling?

What is this "too much"?

From the interview it is clear that "we" is not Allen Dulles. He is supposedly not a talker. By his very position he must not talk "too much." ... The point is, however, that Allen Dulles considers himself not only a chief investigator, but also a diplomat. He says of himself: "I worked in our legation in Bern, Switzerland. I was not an intelligence official, but a diplomatic official; actually I was engaged in political intelligence."

Allen Dulles cannot draw a line between American diplomacy and American espionage. When questioned as to who conducts intelligence work abroad, he bluntly answered: "The main body of information on political and economic questions is gathered by the State Department."

But the matter does not end with "information." Allen Dulles was asked: "It is often said that you send provocateurs into the people's democracies to start revolutions. Is this true?"

Translated from espionage language into ordinary human language this means: "Is it true that you send provocateurs into the people's democracies to commit sabotage and organize counterrevolutionary plots?"

Allen Dulles did not deny this.

What made America's number one spytalk so extensively about his work? It was not because things are going well. Dulles was asked: "What can you tell us about the rumors that congressional committees intend to investigate the work of the C.I.A.?"

Allen Dulles confirmed the "rumors." He spoke of them as facts. He could not conceal his irritation. It became clear who are these "we" who are "telling." They are members of the U.S. Congress and its committees. The "too much" is their wary attitude toward Allen Dulles and his officials.

Thus Allen Dulles informed us of an internal conflict between Congress and the intelligence service. Since their conflict has not yet become a subject for public discussion, there can be no doubt that Allen Dulles has talked "too much" to us.

We also learned the reason for the conflict. It's the lamentable "results" of Allen Dulles' work, the fact that "he is getting nothing done." ...

Allen Dulles states bitterly that the very nature of his work prevents him from showing Congress "documents justifying him." This is not quite true: the indictments of exposed saboteurs and spies in Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, Albania, Hungary, the Chinese People's Republic and Korea serve as documents justifying Dulles. It cannot be said that he "has done nothing." He has done much. But the "results" are certainly not what is expected and demanded by his masters.

Many hundreds of millions of dollars have been appropriated for damaging the social structure of the people's democracies. But nothing has come or will come of this. Congressmen, relying on their rich experience, suppose that these millions of dollars were embezzled and that this is the cause of Allen Dulles' failure. Millions were undoubtedly embezzled, but this is not quite the point. ...

Allen Dulles tries to place the blame for sabotage failures on others, not even sparing his own elder brother. Indeed, the failure of American espionage is also the failure of American diplomacy. The disgrace of the U.S.A. in Korea, the friction between members of the North Atlantic bloc, the serious failures of efforts to set up a Southeast Asian bloc—all this and much more must be attributed to the State Department. ...